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The book of Genesis opens with the narrative of the creation of the universe 
and of the world. Beginning and time are crucial in this account. Applying 
his method of philosophical inquiry, Aquinas – who was targeted by the 
condemnations of Étienne Tempier – concluded that creation does not imply 
the beginning of the universe. In the Summa Theologiae, he expounded on 
this theme and put forward a theory as to why this is so. This article 
attempts to re-read this mediaeval debate, characterized by two 
antagonistic cosmogonic views – philosophical and doctrinal – through 
calculus, notably through the introduction of the limit notion, to which, in 
fact, Thomas does not adhere, but rather adopted an intermediate position. 
Grounded in contemporary cosmology, which endorses the beginning of the 
universe, the Biblical age of the world based on the genealogies contained 
therein tends to absolute present – a fact and not an act of faith – in terms 
of the actual age of the universe. Aquinas not only provided a position of 
‘modus vivendi’ between philosophy and theology, but addressed a 
fundamental issue in the philosophy of science of cosmology. 
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The book of Genesis, a narrative of “primaeval history” 
(Gen 1–11) and “ancestral history” (Gen 12–50) (Bergant 2013, 
xii), opens with the phrase “In the beginning” (Gen 1:1; cf. Holy 
Bible). The term, a transliteration of the ancient Greek word 
γένεσις (genesis), in ancient Hebrew is  ית ֵראשִׁ  Bereshit). Given) בְּ
that the definite article is missing but yet implied, it is 
translated as “In [the] beginning [of something]” (Blenkinsopp 
2011, 30–31). Creation is “creatio continua”, ongoing creation, 
with phases of un-creation and re-creation. This is one motif of 
“primaeval history” (Blenkinsopp 2011, 17); the second – 
related to the problem of evil (see Bianco 1963, Bianco 1968, 
Blenkinsopp 2011) – is beyond the aim of this research note. 
This article presents an assertion and aims to: 
1. enquire why the mediaeval Dominican theologian and 
philosopher Thomas Aquinas (fl. 1225–1274)1 considers 
that creation does not imply the beginning of the 
universe in the Summa Theologiae (ST)2; and  
2. apply the mathematical concept of limit notion to the 
riddle of mediaeval cosmology regarding the eternity or 
temporality of the world. These cosmogonic views are 
respectively grounded in philosophy, notably Aristotle, 
and in the doctrinal teachings of the Scripture. 
In this article, use was made of the edition translated by 




Aquinas distinguished between ‘Æternum’ as referring 
to God (ST 1a. 10, 2) and ‘æternum’ as referring to creatures 
(ST 1a. 10, 3). The term can mean either temporal succession 
without beginning or end – endless time – or a mode of being 
which is not in time at all. This is an accurate translation of 
Aquinas. The first meaning belongs to the sphere of creatures, 
while the other is associated with God. Other useful 
terminology from the mediaeval lexicon includes the terms 
translated as ‘eviternal’ and ‘sempiternal’, the former meaning 
enduring forever, the later referring to infinite duration, that 




is, everlasting. If creatures are aeterna in any sense, then it is 
in the sense of temporal succession without beginning or end. 
There is a hypothetical character to this claim. To overcome 
this ambiguity, the world’s ‘aeternum’ can be translated as 
‘everlasting’, whilst the ‘Æternum’ of God can be treated as 
eternity; S/He endures eternally. The English word 
‘everlasting’ often means unending, without any implication of 
not having a temporal beginning. God is prior to the world by 
priority of duration. His priority is of eternity and not of time 
(ST 1a. 46, 1 ad 8).  
 
2. An issue in Mediaeval Christianity 
The controversy over the eternity of the world was one of 
the significant themes debated during the Christian Middle 
Ages. The historical context was the rediscovery of, and the 
subsequent renewed commentaries on, Aristotle (fl. 384–322) 
notably by the Muslim polymath and jurist Averroes (fl. 1126–
1198). Aristotle argued for the eternal duration of the cosmos, a 
notion which was in conflict with the Scripture. Also, attention 
is drawn to the notion of participation in mediaeval philosophy, 
with hints of Neoplatonism and its connection to the Christian 
doctrine of creation and Genesis (see Liber de causis).3 The 
universal incompatibility of Aristotle with Christian doctrine 
led to the 1277 condemnation by Stephen Tempier, who 
prohibited the teaching of 219 philosophical and theological 
theses which were being debated at the time at the Faculty of 
Arts of the University of Paris. Aquinas was targeted by these 
condemnations (Hissette 1997).4 
A publication on the thirteenth-century academic debate 
on the eternity of the world by Jakob Hans Josef Schneider 
(1999) has recently been issued in the reputable journal 
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge. 
Schneider (1999) argues that the crucial issue the mediaeval 
scholars5 – in particular, the eclectic scholar Henry of Ghent (fl. 
c. 1217–1293), the Franciscan friar Bonaventura (fl. 1221–
1274),6 Aquinas, the Augustinian friar Giles of Rome (fl. c. 1243 
– 1316) and the Dominican friar Boethius of Dacia (fl. c. 13th 
century) – were addressing was the relationship between 
philosophy and theology, a debate which gradually led to the 
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foundation of philosophy as a discipline independent from 
theology. An anthology of main texts on this controversial 
theme by these Christian thinkers, including Archbishop of 
Canterbury John Peckham (fl. c. 1230–1292) and the 
Franciscan friar William of Ockham (fl. c. 1287–1347), all in 
response to Aquinas’ De Aeternitate Mundi, was published in 
Paris less than two decades ago (Michon 2004).  
The cosmological debate centred on two antagonistic 
philosophical views: whether one can conclude that the world 
was created through reason only, or that it is impossible to do 
so as this proposition is an act of faith. It was an attempt by 
mediaeval scholars to reconcile Aristotelian philosophy with 
Christian theology – that is, to align reason with biblical 
revelation – to resolve the assertion that the Universe is eternal 
and uncreated with the thesis of the absolute beginning of the 
Universe. In De Aeternitate Mundi, Boethius of Dacia argued 
against the temporal beginning of the world and maintained 
that creation is not conceivable. The French school maintained 
that this cannot be the case, as it is logically proven that it is 
temporary. In De Aeternitate Mundi, Aquinas adhered to 
neither, instead adopting an intermediate position which 
reconciled these opposing views, by arguing that the creation of 
the world and the eternity of the world are not mutually 
exclusive from one another, but neither one can be proven; it is 
a matter of dogma. A recent study on this theme has been 
undertaken by Forment (2014), who claims that these three 
differing positions are grounded in the three varying responses 
put forward with respect to the issue of reason and faith. 
 
3. Creation of the world in the Summa Theologiae 
The universe had an absolute beginning, ‘creatio ex 
nihilo’ – “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” (Gen 
1:1) – or beginning out of chaos – “Now the earth was a formless 
void, there was darkness over the deep, and a divine wind 
sweeping over the waters” (Gen 1:2). This could be read as the 
state of the universe prior to creation (Bandstra 1999, 38–39), 
the context for his development project, planet earth. There is 
ambiguity in the Latin word ‘initium’, as it can mean temporal 
commencement or non-temporal origin. Two notions of beginning 




in the phasing of creation are present: beginning from the 
beginning and beginning from something else/development of 
what exists – creation out of nothingness and creation from 
something else. 
As regards the definition given above, nothing except 
God can be eternal. Recalling ST, 1a 19.3, Aquinas restates 
that “absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should 
will anything except himself” (ST, 1a 46.1 resp.). He concludes 
that “there is no need for God to will anything other than 
himself” (Davis, 144). It is not necessary for God to will that the 
world should always exist. Furthermore, “since the necessity of 
the effect depends on the necessity of the cause” (ST, 1a 46.1 
resp.), the world exists for as long as God wills it. 
An everlasting effect such as the everlastingness of the 
world need not result from God’s eternally being in action. An 
effect such as the existence of the world follows as ordered by 
his will. It is possible from the changeless (ST, 1a 46.1 ad 5) 
and eternal power to will of God to bring the existence of the 
world about at the time that it is eternally willed by him to be 
brought about (ST, 1a 46.1 ad 10). The “world was made by 
him” implies that it was preordained eternally by his will (ST, 
1a 46.1 ad 9).  
While remaining himself unchanged, God can produce a 
new effect. It is possible for a thing to be moved by God, for the 
new motion follows from God’s will that that motion shall be 
(ST, 1a 46.1 ad 5). The eternity of God's will is different from 
the eternity of God. It seems that the ‘aeternitas participata’ is 
different from the ‘aeternitas divina’ – a kind of intermediary 
between it and ‘aeternitas mundi’. God is said to be prior to the 
world by duration, that is, in terms of the mode of his existence, 
not necessarily in a temporal sense. Here the word ‘primum’ 
stands for a priority which is not of time but can be eternal; it is 
used here because eternity is thought of as imaginary time, and 
does not imply truly existing time: “There are two kinds of time: 
imaginary and real, the first being external to the material 
universe, and containing within itself all durations” (Phillips 
1959, 120). 
A substantive claim is that the world came into being 
without any change happening in the divine essence, because 
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“the universe did not come out of God by a sort of natural 
necessity” but as the product of his willing it to be (Gilson 1955, 
373). Since “there is no need for God to will anything but 
himself” (ST, 1a 46.1 resp., p.69), God need not have created an 
everlasting world. If God ‘freely’ willed the world, it is 
absolutely impossible to demonstrate that he ‘necessarily’ 
willed it, whether in time or in eternity. The only basis for 
holding that it has not always been in existence, according to 
Aquinas, is that God “made his will manifest to us by revelation 
upon which faith is founded,” A conclusion cannot be reached by 
reason alone: “That the world has not always existed cannot be 
demonstratively proved but is held by faith alone” (ST, 1a 46.2 
resp. p.79). Since God has made it known to humanity through 
revelation, believers must believe that the world had a 
temporal beginning because this is a matter of revelation, but 
one cannot demonstrate it and, strictly speaking, one does not 
‘know’ it. On the contrary, Dodds (2008, 180) notes that in the 
‘sed contra’ (ST, 1a 46.1 resp.), Aquinas cites the Gospel of John 
(17:5) and Proverbs (8:22). Is it a case that these must be taken 
literally? 
 
4. Eternity of the world in Aquinas’ thought 
Nothing apart from God has existed for all eternity. 
Since God’s will is the cause of things, the necessity of their 
being is that of God’s willing them. The world exists as long as 
God wills it. It is not necessary for it to have existed for ever, 
because its existence is totally dependent on God’s will. Its 
everlasting existence cannot be demonstratively proved. God’s 
eternal will and decree to create a temporal world is known 
from revelation. Apart from revelation and faith, it may be 
proved that even a beginningless world is a created world, for 
everlasting matter, if it existed, would not be causeless matter; 
it would still have been by participation and not by necessity. 
A seminal edited publication issued three decades ago 
addressed the theme of this section with respect to Aquinas’ De 
Aeternitate Mundi through six comprehensive studies. De Grijs 
argues that this work is a theological rather than a 
philosophical text (De Grijs 1990, 1–8), a position opposed by 
Aertsen (1990, 9–19). This edited publication addresses the 




responses of his Christian contemporaries on the themes of 
eternity and infinity, namely Bonaventure (Van Veldhuijsen 
1990a), William de la Mare (fl. 1272–1279)7 (Hoenen 1990) and 
Richard of Middleton (fl. 1249–1308)8 (Van Veldhuijsen 1990b) 
as well as the Chancellor of the University of Oxford, Henry of 
Harclay (fl. 1270–1317)9 (Thijssen 1990). Enquiring into the 
infinite is “in itself a mathematical subject” (Thijssen 1990, 83).  
On the basis partly of considerations in logic and physics, and partly in 
the Christian doctrine of creation, Aquinas seems content to let physics 
reach its own conclusions in its own ways, even though theology may 
not always be able to accept them. Yet this issue, at least, is close 
enough in logical space to the heart of Christian doctrine that theology 
does not simply veto the conclusion of classical physics, but provides its 
own reason why it must be false: to posit an external world would be to 
put a creature where only the uncreated Verbum can be, in the 
beginning with God (John 1:2) (Marshall 2005, 23).  
Citing Chenu (1970, 12), De Carvalho (1996, 53) notes that 
… Aquinas wanted to detail the reality, the truth and goodness of a 
creature as universally understood, against an important tradition 
that empasised the precariousness of a creature. His aim was to 
assure the dignity and the existence of God as well (Van Veldhuijsen 
1990a, 30–33). It is on these lines that one can understand Aquinas’ 
invention of a new word to define the created being ‘aeternitas 
participata’ (ST, 1a 10.2 ad 1).  
For Aquinas, creation of the universe is not eternal from 
the standpoint of faith. A recent study proved that his position 
remained consistent through his other works – Scriptum super 
Sententiis, Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae – 
although it becomes more profound (Neacşu 2013). From the 
standpoint of reason, Aristotelian philosophy advocating 
eternal motion and an eternal world is not conclusive either.  
 
5. An attempt to resolve the controversy by means of 
the limit notion 
Aristotle’s notion of infinity was a philosophical one; he 
distinguished between potential and actual infinity, accepting 
the former as a mathematical concept whilst, according to 
Bostock (1972-1973), refuting the existence of actual infinity. 
For example, with respect to the arrow paradox of Zeno of Elea 
(fl. 490–430), Aristotle argued in Physics (Greek: Φυσικὴ 
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ἀκρόασις; Latin: Physica, or Naturales Auscultationes) that 
“time is not composed of indivisible nows any more than any 
other magnitude is composed of indivisibles” (Book VI. Part 9, 
verse 239b5).10  His notion of infinity lacked the precise 
formulation which was introduced through the refinements 
brought by infinitesimal calculus – notably through the work of 
Isaac Newton (1642–1727) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646–1716) whose responses were based on initial physical and 
algebraic intuition respectively (Bagni 2005). Another 
significant arithmetical concept relating to calculus is the limit 
notion, which, historically, was often related to sequences and 
series.11 For example, Gregory of St Vincent (1584–1667) 
referred to Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the Turtle in his 
Opus Geometricum as a geometric series (Bagni 2005). 
Augustin Louis Cauchy (1789–1857), the first 
mathematician to undertake a rigorous study of calculus (Bagni 
2005), defined limit and infinitesimal in the Cours d’analyse 
(Cauchy 1882) thus: “When values of a variable approach 
indefinitely a fixed value, as close as we want, this is the limit 
of all those values. For instance, an irrational number is the 
limit of the different fractions that gave approximate values of 
it. […] When values of a variable are […] lower than any given 
number, this variable is an infinitesimal or an infinitesimal 
magnitude. The limit of such variable is zero.” (Bottazzini, 
Freguglia & Toti Rigatelli 1992, 327-328, Bagni 2005, 459) 
Now, regardless of whether the world (Un) is temporal 
or eternal, it is surely a function of time t, that is, Un = f(t). 
Applying the limit notion, these two positions may be 
reformulated thus: 
A. Limit as t tends to infinity: 
If Un is eternal, f(t) approaches infinity as t approaches 
infinity, or, using standard notation: 
 
where, the = sign is an indicator and not an equal; in the 
limit, t cannot actually converge to infinity but it approaches 
infinity, that is, f(t) is limitless, that is eternal. 
B. Limit as t tends to a: 




If Un is temporal, f(t) approaches y as t approaches a, or, 
using standard notation: 
 
where: 
i. y in the limit of f(t) does exist, that is, the state of the 
Universe at creation at time a; and 
ii. the = sign is an indicator and not an equal; in the limit, t 
actually converges to a, that is, f(t) is limited, hence it 
had a beginning. 
Contemporary cosmology endorses the premise that the 
universe had a beginning; the Earth’s initial formation is 
estimated to be between 4.6 and 4.5 billion years old.12 Geologic 
timescales include the Hadean Eon, an informal interval which 
spans from about 4.6 to 4.0 billion years ago; formal geologic 
time commences with the Archean Eon (4.0 to 2.5 billion years 
ago) (Britannica 2020), and continues into the contemporary 
Anthropocene which, applying the argument of Nobel laureate 
Paul Crutzen (1933–2021), began in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century (Crutzen 2002). This implies that, the limit 
of f(t) tends to a finite number a as t tends to 4.6 billion years, 
which is indeed an incredibly long time. One may indeed argue 
that positions A and B are related:  
If a is the time of creation, even when taking into 
account that the age of the universe tends to infinity, there is a 
continuum, that is, when t tends to ∞, the limit of f(x) as t tends 
to a– is equal to the limit of f(x) as t tends to a+. 
 
Infinity is a notion and not a number and, conversely, its 
reciprocal, that is 1/∞, is undefined. Yet, one can still approach 
∞ by trying to converge to ∞ by attempting a large value of t:  





4 4 x 100 1/4 2.5 x 10-1 
4,000 4 x 103 1/4,000 2.5 x 10-4 
4,000,000 4 x 106 1/4,000,000 2.5 x 10-7 
4,000,000,000 4 x 109 1/4,000,000,000 2.5 x 10-10 
  
One notes that as t increases, its reciprocal approaches 0 
but it is not equal to 0, that is:  
 
In this context, the limit of a function is a dynamic 
process leading to potential infinity and the infinitesimal. One 
may think of billion-year calendars; likewise, million-year 
calendars, thousand-year calendars, and so on.13 These 
geological timescales are immensely large as compared to when 
Hominins appeared 6 and 5.3 million years ago, that is during 
the Miocene epoch, much earlier to the earliest dating in 
archaeological chronology; “in terms of … geological timescales, 
archaeological time is absolute present” (Bianco 2017, 9), or in 
limit language, the Biblical age of the world based on 
genealogies contained therein approaches absolute present as 
the age of Earth approaches Hadean Eon. This is a scientific 
fact and not an act of faith and thus one may argue that the 
Aquinas’ notions of the beginning of the world and the eternity 
of the universe is not mutually exclusive. Thus, Aquinas’s 
decision to opt for partial cosmological agnosticism is a valid 
position from the standpoint of science. In this context, one may 
argue that he did not only put forward a position for the mutual 
coexistence of philosophy and theology, but that his stance is 
fundamental in the philosophy of the science of cosmology and 
central to the foundation of science. 
 
Conclusion 
This article exposes the main thrust of Aquinas’s 
argument, which is based on the assertion that creation exists 
because of God's will, and that creation – even if it were without 
beginning – is only known through revelation, and exists by 
participation in God. This is a fideistic interpretation of 




Aquinas that does not engage with the philosophical reflection 
which he developed in the De Aeternitate Mundi whereby he 
reflects on the distinction between creation and having a 
beginning. Does creation really exist only because God wills it? 
This may be a theological claim, based on revelation, but one 
has to acknowledge the importance of the debate presented by 
Aristotle as commented on by Averroes, that implied that the 
world was without beginning. 
The beginning of the universe is a central issue in 
cosmology. Both mediaeval and contemporary cosmology hold 
that it had a beginning. For Aquinas and other theists, this is 
an 'absolute' beginning – the prime mover and first cause is 
God – whilst a number of theories are postulated by today’s 
science. One way to comprehend the two antagonistic 
mediaeval cosmogonic views is not through the philosophical 
notion of infinity but through the mathematical one. Applying 
the limit notion to the eternity and temporality of the world, it 
can be argued that Aquinas’s position converges with Aristotle’s 
when taking note of the contemporary cosmological assumption 
that the universe had a beginning in time – albeit on a different 
timescale from that given in the Scripture. The mathematical 
notion of ∞ introduced a refined concept of infinity, a function 
that can approach 0 but is never equal to it. In this context, the 
author concurs with Thijssen’s position, cited above (Thijssen 
1990, 83), that Aquinas let science takes its course 
independently of the Christian doctrine contained in the 
Scripture. In doing so, Aquinas did address a major theme in 
the philosophy of science of cosmology that was essential for the 






1 Aquinas’ textual commentaries on Aristotle were drafted at a time when the 
Latin translations of his works made their way to the West. This Aristotelian 
corpus led to reexamination of the relation between reason and faith resulting 
in a new ‘modus vivendi’ between philosophy and theology until the advent of 
the science of physics. He disputed both the interpretations of Aristotle by 
followers of the Islamic scholar Ibn Rushd (fl. 1126–1198), better known as 
Averroes, and the predisposition of the Franciscans to reject Aristotelianism. 
 




2 According to Gilson, Aquinas was “one of the three great metaphysicians 
who ever existed”, the others being Plato and Aristotle (Gilson 1938, 324). 
3 The Liber de Causis, a treatise on Neoplatonist metaphysics, influenced 
mediaeval philosophy along certain paths of thought – in particular, the 
theory of ultimate causes and the introduction of the metaphysical principles 
of monotheism – leading to a metaphysical reinterpretation of Neoplatonist 
philosophy. 
4 In 1270 and 1277, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Paris and the former 
Chancellor of the Sorbonne, Etienne Tempier (fl. ?–1279), known as 
Stephanus of Orleans, condemned his doctrines, which were being disputed at 
the University of Paris. 
5 Two leading branches of Scholasticism were Neoplatonism and 
Aristotelianism. The Franciscan school endorsed the former philosophy, 
mainly read through Augustine of Hippo (fl. 354–430), whilst the Dominican 
school supported the latter. Averroes was a staunch proponent of 
Aristotelianism and vehemently opposed the Neoplatonism of earlier Islamic 
scholars like Al-Farabi (fl. c. 872–c. 950) and Ibn Sina (fl. 980 -1037), known 
in the West as Alpharabius and Avicenna respectively. 
6 Bonaventure’s ideas – significantly influenced by Augustine of Hippo – 
converged with those of Albert the Great and Aquinas on a number of 
theological and philosophical issues. He concurred with the former in reading 
theology as an applied science and disagreed with the later that philosophy 
(reason) is independent of theology (faith). For him, philosophy was the 
handmaid of theology; it was the ‘praeparatio evangelica’. Bonaventure 
rejected the Aristotelian notion of the eternity of the world and thus differed 
from Aquinas with respect to the abstract notion of an eternal universe. An 
authoritative concise scholarly research on the philosophy of Bonaventure and 
Aquinas, published in two parts, was penned by Callus (1940a; 1940b). 
7 De la Mare was influenced by Bonaventura and Roger Bacon (fl. c. 1220–
1292). In 1277–9, de la Mare wrote the Correctorium, or Reprehensorium, a 
work critical of Aquinas. In 1282, this work was prescribed by the Franciscan 
Order to be read along with Aquinas work. Unlike Aquinas, he argued the 
‘principium individuationis’ is form and not matter. 
8 Richard of Middleton was significantly influenced by Bonaventure and 
Aquinas. Although his philosophy was indebted to Neoplatonism, he 
concurred with Aquinas when including Aristotelian notions in his 
philosophy. 
9 Henry of Harclay was significantly influenced by the Franciscan John Duns 
Scotus (fl. 1265/66–1308), his philosophy teacher at the Sorbonne. He 
defended the theory that “the world and movement could have existed from 
all eternity” and asserted that “God [has] the power to do anything that is 
known not to include a contradiction or that is not known to include [one]” 
(Harclay 2008, 753). 
Callus, the first member of the Dominican Order to receive a degree from the 
University of Oxford since the Reformation (Bianco, 2020), had undertaken 
pioneering research in Aristotelian learning in the thirteenth century at his 
alma mater (Callus, 1938; Callus, 1943) including the subsequent 
condemnation of Aquinas at the same university (Callus, 1946). 
 





10 Although philosophers, such as Alba Papa-Grimaldi, argue that the 
paradoxes of the Zeno are metaphysical problems (Papa-Grimaldi 1996), 
scientists – such as Carl Boyer – argue that they are mathematical problems 
which are resolved through calculus (Boyer 1959), notably the notion of a 
convergent infinite series (Burton 2010). 
11 The historical roots of the limit notion with respect to the development of its 
representation registers and cognitive development are the subject of a study 
by Bagni (2005). Citing Tall (1985) and Tall & Vinner (1981), he notes that 
“the limit process is intuitive from the mathematical point of view, but not 
from the cognitive one sometimes cognitive images conflict with the formal 
definition of limit. The limit of a function is often considered as a dynamic 
process, so it is considered in the sense of potential infinity and infinitesimal” 
(Bagni 2005, 454). 
12 Indeed, using radiometric dating, scientists discovered rocks in 
northwestern Canada and in Australia which are about 4.0 and 4.3 billion 
years old respectively. Rocks from the moon and meteorites that have landed 
on Earth are dated to between 4.5 and 4.4 billion years ago. This supports the 
claim that bodies in the solar system may have formed at similar times. 
(Bodies in the solar system formed later than those in other parts of the 
universe; the universe is thought to have formed 13.8 billion years ago).  
13 Based on the genealogies contained in the two versions of Genesis, the 
world was created about 5500 BC and about 4000 BC according to the Greek 
Old Testament and the Hebrew/Aramaic Masoretic text respectively. 
According to both versions, the creation of the world is presented as a 
development project undertaken in seven phases – from Day 0 (the beginning, 
that is, forming the context of creation) to Day 7 (the final phase, that is, 
completion of creation). These phases can be further read in terms of 
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